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Abstract 
This thesis extends the standard 2 x 2 trade model with cash-in-advance constraints 
and endogenous labor supply. With endogenous labor supply, Mayer (1990) shows 
that free trade maximizes the welfare of a small open economy but has negative 
impact on labor supply. Palivos and Yip (1997) show that in the presence of 
cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint without endogenous labor supply, money may 
distort a country's welfare. This thesis merges these models to study the welfare 
implication of trade policies. First, we show that in the presence of cash-in-advance 
constraint or consumption distortions, tariffs may deteriorate the welfare and the labor 
supply. This result is relevant to Mayer (1990) and Palivos and Yip (1997). Next, we 
extend the model to study the effects of other trade policies, including quotas, wage 
tax and indirect taxes, revealing that free trade cannot maximize the country's welfare, 




應出現負面的影響。Palivos and Yip (1997)証明在貨幣流量限制時，貨幣的出現 
會影響社會福利。本論文嘗試結合以上兩個模型，來討論貿易政策的福利含意。 
另一方面，本論文証實當貨幣流量限制存在時，關稅會損害社會福利及影響勞動 
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1 Introduction 
One major proposition of international trade is that, the first best policy 
for a small open barter economy calls for free trade, i.e. zero tariff, zero wage 
tax, zero capital tax, zero consumption tax and zero production subsidy. 
There axe some related work by Mayer (1991), Michael (1994), Fung (1995), 
and Michael and Hatzipanayotou (1995, 1997), showing that free trade is 
beneficial in the case where factor (i.e. labor) supplies are variable. How-
ever, for a small monetary economy, Kemp (1990), Palivos and Yip (1997) 
and Chao and Yip (2001) show that an improvement of term of trade is not 
necessarily beneficial if money is not equally efficacious in all markets, imply-
ing that free trade is no longer optimal but alternative trade policies, such 
as tariffs, import quotas, indirect taxes and subsidies, are able to improve 
welfare. 
In the presence of endogenous labor supply, Mayer (1991) examines the 
welfare and employment effects of a tariff based on the basic setup used in 
Dixit and Norman (1980) and Woodland (1982). The effects of other trade 
restrictions, such as quotas, voluntary export restrictions (VERs), and lump 
sum foreign transfer, are done by Michael (1994), Fung (1995), and Michael 
and Hatzipanayotou (1995, 1997). They all show that free trade is the first 
best policy, but the second best policy is preferred if one market is distorted 
by other taxes. Moreover, a rise in tariff or a reduction of import quotas 
increases employment when the importable is labor intensive in production 
and is substitute for leisure. However, this implication cannot apply to a 
monetary economy. 
In the presence of money serving as a media of exchange, Palivos and 
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Yip (1997) and Chao and Yip (2001) show that money creates a demand-
side distortion if it is not equally efficacious in all markets. Either tariffs or 
consumption taxes are required to enhance welfare. However, if the monetary 
distortions are equal in all markets, then free trade is still first best. However, 
it is not the case if endogenous labor supply is considered. 
Following the literature, this thesis continues the welfare and employment 
analysis of free trade in a small open monetary economy with variable labor 
supply. There are three reasons for us to consider a model in the presence of 
money and variable labor supply. First, in reality, money always serves as a 
medium of exchange, and an effective cash requirement is needed for each unit 
of consumption. Next, Johnson and Layard (1986) have shown that variable 
labor supply is a more realistic assumption for long run equilibrium. The 
last but not least, a model with endogenous labor supply offers us a natural 
framework for studying the effects of a wage tax, which have been ignored 
in the trade literature. Therefore, it is worth developing a general model 
with these features. Following Kemp (1990), Palivos and Yip (1997) and 
Chao and Yip (2001), we introduce money via a generalized cash-in-advance 
(CIA) constraint. Following Dixit and Norman (1980), Woodland (1982), 
Mayer (1991), and Michael and Hatzipanayotou (1995, 1997), we assume 
the working population is fixed with flexible working hours. Our goal is to 
combine the endogenous labor supply model of Mayer (1991) and the CIA 
model of Palivos and Yip (1997) , and show that free trade is not optimal. 
We first revise the CIA model adopted in Chao and Yu (1999) and Chao and 
Yip (2001), proving that the effect of tariffs and quotas axe equivalent in the 
presence of both monetary distortions and endogenous labor supply. Next, 
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we find that the optimal tariff always serves as the second best policy, and 
zero tax on trade, on wage and on consumption is no longer the first best 
policy when monetary distortions really exist. 
The thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief literature review 
of the key references, previews some major findings of our model, and finally 
compares our results with the literature. In Section 3’ we set up a two-by-two 
general equilibrium model. Section 4 examines the welfare and employment 
effect of tariffs and quotas. And Section 5 derives the formula of the optimal 
tariff. Section 6 investigates an indirect taxation system, while Section 7 
offers some concluding remarks. 
2 Literature reviews, contributions of this thesis and the 
comparison 
2.1 Literature reviews 
The aim of this thesis is to develop a general model by merging two basic 
models from Mayer (1991) and Chao and Yu (1999), capturing the ideas of 
endogenous labor-leisure choice and the monetary distortions. Therefore, the 
literature reviews are separated into two parts: one focuses on the endogenous 
labor supply models by Mayer (1991), Michael (1994), Fung (1995), and 
Michael and Hatzipanayotou (1995) and the other includes the CIA models 
by Palivos and Yip (1997), Chao and Yu (1999) and Chao and Yip (2001). 
2.11 Endogenous labor supply models 
"Endogenous labor supply in international trade theory: Two alternative 
models" by Mayer (1991) develops a 2x2 (two factors and two goods) general 
equilibrium model of a small open economy with endogenous labor supply, 
investigating the employment effect of a term of trade improvement and a 
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tariff. The model is characterized by the following equations: 
e [1，（1 + T)P, L,n] = i ? [ l , ( l + r)p, L, K] + prm (2.1a) 
tL [1，(1 + r)p, L, u\ = Rl [1, (1 + r)p, L,K]=w (2.1b) 
m = 62 — R2 (2.1c) 
where p is the world price of the importable, r is the tariff rate, m is the 
volume of import, L is the employment, K is the domestic fixed capital, w is 
the return of labor, e [•] and R [•] axe the domestic expenditure function and 
the GDP function, respectively. Equation (2.1a) is the income-expenditure 
balance condition and equation (2.1b) is the labor market clearing condition. 
Simple comparative statistics yields 
dL rriL L , \ /o o � 
^ 二 - — ^ + - ( � ” L n ^ + ”Lp ) (2.2a) 
令二 L {e^pVL^ + r)Lp ) (2.2b) 
where m i G ( - 1 , 0 ) is the marginal propensity of labor supply, r]Lp > 0 
(< 0) is the compensated elasticity of labor supply with respect to price 
when leisure and consumption axe complements ( s u b s t i t u t e s )，> 0 is the 
compensated elasticity of labor supply with respect to wage rate, > 1 
(< —1) is the Stopler-Samuelson effect when the importable is labor (capital) 
intensive in production. Mayer (1991) denotes — • — m and [E—R]Lw + VLP ) 
as the income effect and the substitution effect, respectively. The sign of the 
substitution effect depends on the relative factor intensity of the importable 
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in production and whether the importable is a complement to or substitute 
for leisure. The substitution effect is positive (negative) when the importable 
is labor (capital) intensive in production and substitute for leisure. Following 
Mayer (1991) the propositions are shown as follows: 
A price rise of the import good definitely raises the country's 
labor supply if the [importable] is [labor] intensive in production 
and substitute for leisure in consumption. 
A tariff raises the supply of labor if the [importable] is [labor 
intensive in production and substitute for leisure in consumption. 
However, if the [importable] is [capital] intensive, the directions 
of labor supply response may differ. 
Throughout the paper, Mayer (1991) doesn't mention anything about 
welfare since the welfare effect is still equivalent to the existing literature, 
which can be manipulated and characterized by the following equations easily 
by setting T 二 0. 
du 1 / 一 、 
— = — — m (2.3a) 
dp Bu 
J = 0 (2.3b) 
Equation (2.3a) and (2.3b) imply that a term of trade improvement always 
improves welfare but a tariff always hurts the economy, which is a standard 
proposition in the international trade theory, saying that free trade is still 
first best for the case of endogenous labor supply. 
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"Quotas, GNP, and labor supply in a small open economy" by Fung 
(1995) simply extends Mayer (1991) model by introducing quotas into the 
model, showing the consistence of quotas and tariffs. The general equilibrium 
conditions are as follows: 
e{l,p,L,u) = R{l,p,L)-\-{p-p*)Q (2.4a) 
eL{ l ,P ,L,u) = RL{ l ,P ,L) = w (2.4b) 
Q = 62 - i?2 (2.4c) 
where p is the domestic price of good 2, p* is the world price, Q is the size of 
import quotas and {p — p*) Q is the quota rent. The employment effect and 
the price effect of quotas are 
dL eLL (爪L , , 么 � 1 爪2(P-_P*)1 , , � 1 / � c � 
二 者 ( 广 广 h + 7 [1 - "““^J ( 〜 + "LP)} (2圳 
dp eiL /i rn2 {p 一 P*)丄 ^ ^ ^ 丄們� \ /q - a 
^ = P + + "LP ) j (2.5b) 
where D = (eL2 —凡L2)2 — Cll (e22 —只22) is the determinant of the differ-
entiated system which is positive in stability, 7 = 622 - R22 < 0, Cll > 0, 
7712 = ^ ^ € (0,1) is the marginal propensity of good 2 and other notations 
eu 
follow Mayer (1991) definition. Following Fung (1995), the propositions are 
An ir.crease in import quotas reduces the equilibrium labor supply 
if the importable is labor intensive and a complement to leisure 
in consumption. Otherwise, the effect is indeterminate. 
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An increase in import quotas reduces the domestic price of the im-
portable if the good is capital intensive and substitute for leisure 
in consumption. Otherwise, the effect is indeterminate. 
However, such results seem to be different from Mayer (1991), however, 
if we consider that there is free trade initially, i.e. p-p* = 0, equations (2.5) 
can be reduced to 
尝 = 苦 舍 ( � + 细） （2.6a) 
宴 = 等 （2.6b) 
dQ n \ ) 
implying that a decrease in import quotas increases (decreases) labor supply 
when the importable is labor (capital) intensive and substitute for leisure, 
which is now consistent with Mayer (1991) result as a rise in tariff is equiva-
lent to a decrease in quotas. And equation (2.6b) shows that an increase in 
quotas always reduces the importable price level. 
"Tariffs, quotas, voluntary export restraints with endogenous labor sup-
ply" by Michael and Hatzipanayotou (1995) reproduce Mayer (1991) model, 
adding a new variable, the wage tax r^^ and developing a general model con-
sidering different kinds of trade restrictions, such as tariffs, quotas, voluntary 
export restraints and lump sum transfers from aboard. The equilibrium con-
7 
ditions are^ 
z (p, L,u)=e (p, L,u)-R (p, L) = TZp (p, L,u)+T (2.7a) 
Zp {p, L, u) = ep (p, L,u)-Rp (p, L) (2.7b) 
CL (P, L、U) = RL (P, L)-T^ = WN (2.7c) 
where rZp (p, L, u) is the tariff revenue or the quota rent, r represents the 
specific tariff for the case of tariff, r =p-p* for the case of quotas and r = 0 
for the case of VERs, T is the lump sum transfer from aboard, Zp (•) is the 
volume of import, t^ is the specific tax on wages and Wn is the net wage 
earned by the household. Without using any notation of elasticity, Michael 
and Hatzipanayotou (1995) conclude the employment effects of different trade 
policies as follows 
(iZ/ 
A r — 二 —[之Lp + TZpp (zlu - ^Lp^ppZpu)] (2.8a) 
A g 差 = - [ z L p + TZpp (zlu — ZLpZp^Zpu)] (2.8b) 
A ^ - ^ = - [zLp + ZpZLu] (2.8c) 
dZp 
where A^ is the determinants with respect to different trade policies, with 
r denoted as tariffs, q denoted as quotas and v denoted as VERs, At > 
0, Ag < 0 and A^ < 0 for stability. Prom equations (2.8), Michael and 
1 According to Michael and Hatzipanayotou (1995), the wage taxes are assumed to 
be redistributed back to the household as a lump-sum transfer. Therefore, Michael and 
Hatzipanayotou (1995) claim that the tax revenue r^L doesn't appear in the right-hand 
side of income-expenditure idendity. 
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Hatzipanayotou (1995) conclude that 
A small departure from free trade in the case of a tariff and a 
quota, so that r is close to zero, and a large departure in the case 
of VERs, so that imports are close to zero, increases (decreases) 
employment if the importable is labor (capital) intensive and a 
complement to (substitute for) leisure in consumption. 
This proposition has a key difference from Mayer (1991) since Mayer 
(1991) doesn't capture the idea that the importable is a complement to leisure 
in consumption. However, if we transform zip into elasticities,^ then we have 
Zlp = -Cll^ {vlp + � ” L w ) , and equations (2.8a) and (2.8b) become 
A t 芸 = b l l ^ {r]Lp + SwpriLw) (2.9a) 
A g ^ = CLL^ (VLP + ^WPVLW) (2.9b) 
Now we can see both (2.9a) and (2.2b) are closely related, and both (2.9b) and 
(2.6a) are the same. Consequently, one can say that all results in the above 
papers axe consistent with one another and Michael and Hatzipanayotou 
(1995) fill the gap that is not included in Mayer (1991). On the other hand, 
the welfare effects in Michael and Hatzipanayotou (1995) are 
Ar^ 二 zll {rZpp - Ty^zllzip) (2.10a) 
2As ZLP = EIP 一 RLP = g l l f — - ^ ^ ^ ’ substituting ^ =—丄Ty^p and ^ ^ = 
“ \eLL GLL / &LL P ^LL 
—^WP'HLW (for more details see Appendix B), we get 
P L 
Zip = -GLL— (^ Lp + ^wpVLW) 
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〜盖=ZLL {rZpp — Ty^zllzLp) (2.10b) 
= -ZLL {ZP - T^ZIIZLP) (2.10C) 
where 乏仰=z仰-zpiz'^zip is negative. First, the similarity of equations 
(2.8a) and (2.8b), and (2.10a) and (2.10b) shows that the welfare and employ-
ment effects of a tariff and a quota are definitely the same. Next, equations 
du du 
(2.10a) and (2.10b) say that if r = r^ = 0, then both — = — = 0, con-
cluding that free trade and zero wage tax is the first best policy. The second 
best policy exists only if either trade is not free or the wage tax is not zero. 
"The welfare and employment effects of trade and factor taxes with vari-
able factor supply" by Michael (1994) develops a general trade model with 
many traded goods, many internationally mobile factors, and with endoge-
nous labor supply, examining the welfare and employment effects of different 
taxations, such as the taxes on trade (tariffs or export subsidies), on wages 
and on the returns of other international mobile factors. This model is very 
complicated including n + 1 traded goods with the price of the last good 
normalized as 1, m international mobile factors and 1 endogenous variable, 
labor. Define p = p* + T and r = r* + p denoted as the vector of domestic 
prices and the vector of domestic returns of other factors, respectively, where 
p* is the world prices vector, r is the specific tariffs vector, r* is the world 
factor returns vector and p is the factor taxes vector. The system equations 
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following Michael (1994) are 
z (p, r, L,u) = e (p, L,u)-G (p, r, L) = r'zp {p, r, L, u) + p'zr (p, r, L, u) 
(2.11a) 
ei {p, L, u) = Gl (p, r, L) - t^ = Wn (2.11b) 
Zr (P, r, L, u) = -Gr (p, r,L)=K (2.11c) 
Zp (p, r, L, u) = ep (p, L, u) - Gp (p, r, L) (2 . l id) 
where e (•) is the expenditure function, G {•) = g {p, L, K) - r'K is defined as 
the GDP function minus the cost of inflow factors, K denotes as m interna-
tional mobile factors, and i' is the row vector with respect to element i. The 
employment and welfare effects of different taxes are 
A ^ = -r'Zpp {ZLU - ZLpZ'pZpu) - p'ZrpZLu _ ^Lp (2.12a) 
A 兵 = - ( 1 - t V ) (2.12b) 
dTw 
A = - t ' {ZprZLu - ZpaZLr) — p'^ rr^Lu — ^Lr (2.12c) 
dp 
zZlAdu = - { v l l + r'zpLZll + p'zrizll) dr^ 
+ {r'zpp + p'zrp - T^ZIIZLP) dr 
+ {r'Zpr + p'Zrr 一 Tzllzir) dp (2.12d) 
where A is the determinant of the differentiated system. To get a specific 
result, saying that there are two goods and two factors, equation (2.12d) 
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implies that the first best policy for a small open economy is zero tax on 
trade, on wage and on capital return. If one set of the taxes is not zero, 
then the second best, which could be taxes or subsidies on the other two, 
can improve the welfare. Next, if r^ ； = r = p = 0, then equations (2.12a, b, 
� , , , �dL o . dL ^ , . dL _ A 
c) can be reduced to A — = -Z lp , A - ~ = - 1 and A — = - z i r = 0, 
dr dTw dp 
showing that the employment effect of a tariff is the same as Michael and 
Hatzipanayotou (1995), a rise in wage tax reduces employment and a rise in 
capital tax has no effect on labor supply. 
2.12 The CIA models 
"The gains from trade for a monetary economy once again" by Palivos and 
Yip (1997) first introduce money in international trade model. Different from 
standard trade models, they use a dynamic approach to study the effect of 
money. Money serves as a media of exchange characterized by the generalized 
CIA constraint ^iPiCi + 02P2C2 < M'^, where is a unit cash requirement of 
consumption of good i and M^ is the cash holding balance by the household 
to finance the consumption. First of all, Palivos and Yip (1997) show that 
the welfare effect of a term of trade improvement is 
—=—mdp + rpdm + 5(1 + T)dc2 (2.13) 
Ui 
where ui is the marginal utility of good 1, m is the volume of import, r is 
3Following Michael (1994), zlp = eLp - Gip < 0 (> 0) if the importable is labor 
(capital) intensive and a complement (substitute) of leisure. Thus, — > 0 (< 0) if the 
importable is labor (capital) intensive and a complement (substitute) of leisure. 
‘‘According to Michael (1994), zlt = - G l t = -9lk9k^k^ with qlk = 0 in the case of 
two factors and two goods model but qlk > 0 in the case of two goods and three factors 
model or the specific factor model. 
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the tariff rate, C2 is the consumption of good 2, p is the world price and 5 = 
(02 - + -g the relative monetary distortions with p denoted as the 
1 + 01 (P + ") 
rate of time preference and fi denoted as the exogenous money growth rate. 
Under free trade, i.e. t 二 0，a term of trade improvement not necessarily 
improve welfare if the monetary distortions of good 1 and 2 are different 
^ 02 ^ 0). Palivos and Yip (1997) find that a drop in import price 
improves welfare if ^ cj)�, and it is indeterminate if < 02- Next, the 
formula of optimal tariff rate is 
产 ^ (2.14) 
T (1 +和 l)es 、) 
where a = — > 1 is the consumption to import ratio, = < 0 is the 
m oPh C2 
demand elasticityof good 2 with ph denoted as the home price of good 2，and 
= > 0 is the supply elasticity of good 2.5 Equation (2.14) implies 
dph X2 
that an optimal tariff is positive (negative) if 02 < (0i < 02)，but zero if 
= 02 (=)0, showing that free trade is no longer optimal for monetary 
economy in the presence of CIA restriction. Since monetary distortions are 
equivalent to consumption distortions, because marginal domestic rate of 
substitution, MDRS, is not equal to marginal foreign rate of transformation, 
MFRT，the first best policy should be a consumption tax instead and the 
optimal consumption tax rate shown in Palivos and Yip (1997) is = 
Consequently, a consumption tax (subsidy) is preferred if 02 < 
1 + J 
^Thoughtout this thesis, we use e^  e (-l,0)and e^  e (0,1) represent the elasticities of 
demand and supply of good 2，respectively, but Palivos and Yip (1997) use e" G (0，1) and 
e^  G (0，1) instead. 
6The difference between MDRS and MFRT is {l + 5)p-p = 5p. Under the optimal 
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(01 < 02), whereas it is zero if 0i = <^>2 (=)0, showing that the first best 
policy for the case of equal monetary distortion = 02 0) is still zero 
consumption tax but a consumption tax (subsidy) if 02 < < 
This finding revises the tradition proposition that zero tax on trade and on 
consumption is the first best case. Finally, Palivos and Yip (1997) show that a 
. 1 du 1 du dx2 _ 
consumption tax is Pareto superior to a tariti as ： — = r p - — > (J. 
ui CLTc ui ar ar 
"Shadow Prices and trade restrictions in a monetary economy" by Chao 
and Yu (1999) extend Palivos and Yip (1997) idea of the CIA constraint, 
developing a more useful static general equilibrium model to study the effect 
of a lump sum transfer from aboard, which is generally called the shadow 
price of foreign exchange. First, using the homogenous property, they derive 
the expenditure function of the household as E [(1 + Pi, (1 + (^ 2) P2, u ] = 
+ where py = ^ ^ ^ ^ = is called the virtual 
price, which represents the CIA distorted domestic price ratio, with pi nor-
malized as 1. By Shephard's lemma, Ei = (1 + ^ J e i = ci and E2 = 
(1 + (/)i) 62 = C2 where EI and e^  are the partial derivatives of E (•) and e (.)， 
respectively. Next, the GDP function follows the standard form R ( l ,p , R ) , 
therefore, the income-expenditure balance is 
(1 + (M e (l，p们 u) = R K)+M + {l-uj) {p-p*)m + T (2.15a) 
m = C2 - = (1 + </>i) 62 - R2 (2.15b) 
consumption tax rate, i.e. = the MDRS^o^t = {1 + S)p + {1 + S)p = p, 
which is equal to MFRT. 
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where M is the stock of money supply, T is the lump sum transfer from 
aboard, p is the domestic price, p* is the fixed world price and (1 - u) {p - p*) m 
is the tariff revenue or quota rent, where w 二 0 for the cases of tariffs and 
quotas, but cj = 1 for the case of VERs. The results in this paper are far 
beyond our discussion, so we just leave it but only mention the basic setup. 
"Non-traded goods and optimal trade policy in a cash-in-advance econ-
omy" by Chao and Yip (2001) extend Chao and Yu (1999) by adding non-
traded good to the model Following Chao and Yu (1999), they define the 
general equilibrium conditions as follows 
(1 + 01) e q们 u)=R ( l ,p , q,K)+M + Tm (2.16a) 
(l + 0i)e3 = i^ 3 (2.16b) 
m = (1 + 62 - R2 (2.16C) 
where = ^ + ^^p and q^  =丄 + are the virtual price of the importable 
and the non-traded good, respectively, p is the importable price, q is the 
non-traded good price, t = p - p* is the specific tariff with p* denoted as the 
world price and m is the volume of import. Equation (2.16b) and (2.16c) are 
the market clearing conditions for non-traded good and good 2, respectively. 
The optimal tariff is 
Topt = (<f>2-Me2^33-((/>3-M^32 (2.17) 
S22S33 — E23 仏 2 
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where ^ij = ( l + 0 � e i j — Rij with E j^ < (>) 0 for i = (—) 1 and S22S33 — 
E23E32 > 0. Prom equation (2.17), Chao and Yip (2001) summarize the 
proposition as follows: 
In a small monetary economy with non-traded goods, the optimal 
tariff T叩t is positive when 於！ > max、(！>2,03) whereas it is negative 
when < min(02, </>3)- Finally, if min (02, (j)^ ) < (pi, then the 
sign of is ambiguous. 
Following Palivos and Yip (1997), the next step is to study the consump-
tion taxes of both good 2 and good 3. The optimal indirect tax structure 
is 
opt = (1 + 03) (02 - 62633 - (1 + M (诊3 - M 63623 (2 18a) 
Tp - (1 + (ps) (1 + 02) (622633 - 623632) • 
opt = (1 + M (03 - 01) 62622 - (1 + fe) (02 — M 62^ 23 
Tq — (1 + (fe) (1 + 03) (622633 — 623632) • 
Equations (2.18) confirm that both consumption taxes on the importable 
and the non-traded good are zero if = = = 0. In particular, another 
proposition is 
If (j)^  ^ max (02’ 03), then both the optimal 丁卩 and Tq are positive. 
On the other hand, if (pi < max ( ^ 2 � t h e n both the optimal Tp 
and Tq are negative. Finally, if min (02, (f>s) < < max ((^ >2，(ps), 
we may need a combination of consumption tax and subsidy to 
improve welfare. 
Again Chao and Yip (2001) prove that free trade and zero consumption 
tax is not the first best in the presence of unequal monetary distortions, 
which corroborates Palivos and Yip (1997) result. 
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2.2 Contributions of this thesis and the comparison 
The main contribution of this thesis develops a general static trade model 
with endogenous labor and the CIA constraint, revising the models in Chao 
and Yu (1999) and Chao and Yip (2001). First of all, the general equilibrium 
conditions in our model are 
e L,u) = R (1’p，L, K) + (p - p*) m + Y^P^' (2.19a) 
m = 62(1,p., L, u) - i?2(l ’P, L, K) (2.19b) 
(1 + 0i)eL(l’P们 L, u) = L, K) - r^ (2.19c) 
where m is the volume of import, p is the domestic price ratio, p — p* = r 
is the specific tariff, p* is the foreign price, py 二 is the virtual price, 
丄十</>i 
————pe2 is the virtual income generated by the monetary distortions, r^ 
1 + 01 
is the specific wage tax, e (.) and R (•) are the reduced forms of the expendi-
ture function and GDP function, respectively (for more details, see Section 
III). Equation (2.19a) is the income-expenditure balance condition, which 
is different from Chao and Yu (1999) and Chao and Yip (2001). Compar-
ing the income expenditure identity/ Chao and Yu (1999) and Chao and 
Yip (2001) treat the money stock M as a kind of income and add it to the 
right hand side of the identity, however, our model use the virtual income 
————pe2 to capture the income effect generated by the difference of mon-
1 + 01 
etaxy distortions. There are two reasons why our model is preferred to Chao 
7ln Chao and Yu (1999), the income expenditure identity is (1 + (^丄）e (l’p们 w ) = 
R {l,p,K)+M+{l -u) {p-p*)m+T, while in Chao and Yip is {1 + (p-^) e{l,pv,q^,u)= 
R(l,p,q,K) + M + rm. 
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and Yu (1999) and Chao and Yip (2001). First, according to the homoge-
nous property, the expenditure function is E ((1 + <^i)Pi’ (1 + ^2)^2, L, u)= 
(1 + 0i)pie (l’p仍 L, u), then by Shephard's lemma, the consumption of good 
1 and good 2 should be Ci = ~ ~ = 丑 1 = e (.) — and C2 = 
—————=E2 = 62, but Chao and Yu (1999) and Chao and Yip 
a(l + (/)2)P2 
(2001) derive ci 二 = (1 + ei and C2 =丑2 二 (1 + M 62, respectively. 
Next, the initial form of income-expenditure identity should be written as 
PiCi + P2C2 + Md = piXi + P2X2 + rm + M, where M^ = M for asset market 
clearing condition, therefore M should not appear in the income-expenditure 
identity. 
Simple comparative statistics exercise, evaluating at P — P* = T = 0, gives 
du 1 w \ L l-\- 4)1 I 
r Z : + 去 丄 卞 絲 仏 > 
(2.20a) 
些 二 二 1 + 01 尸 (2.20b) 
� L \ 丄十 
du I W r 1 02 - 01 d . 1 ^ 1 , 01 一 伞2 …\ / , ^ � � \ 
— = 7 7 — T ? , + 7 — 7 hVLw + 1 , ^ VLP (VLP + VLw^wp) ^ 
(2.20c) 
dL 1 CuW r 02 - ^L L / 02 “ \ ( , 
37： = 7 7 7 ^ < V , + 一 1 - 7 /7712 [Vlp + ”Lw^wp) f 
dQ ^Lr]^^ I 1 + 01 w p V 1 + 01 / J 
(2.20d) 
where A > 0 and H < 0 are the determinants of differentiated system 
QC 
for the cases of a tariff and a quota, respectively, e" = e (—1,0) 
op C2 
Qnj 7) 
is the demand elasticity of good 2, e^^ = — — is Stopler-Samuelson wage's 
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effect which is > 1 (< —1) when good 2 is labor (capital) intensive in 
Q L肌 
production, = - - G (0,1) is elasticity of labor supply with respect 
dw L 
T 
to wage rate, ?7r_ = — — is labor supply elasticity with respect to price, 
P op L 
which is > 0 (< 0) when leisure and good 2 are complements (substitutes), 
Q L 
rriL = w — e ( - 1 , 0 ) is the marginal propensity to labor supply with leisure 
C/C 
assumed to be normal good, m2 = ^ ^ e (0,1) is the marginal propen-
sity of good 2, and — > 0 is the marginal utility of income. First of all, 
Cu 
the similarity of equations (2.20a) and (2.20c), (2.20b) and (2.20d) corrobo-
rates the equivalence of tariffs and quotas. Next, to examine the results in 
Mayer (1991), Michael (1994), Fung (1995), and Michael and Hatzipanayotou 
(1995), setting = (^>2 = 0, we get 芸 = 尝 二 0, implying free trade is op-
d, YJ 1 e xu 
timal, — = — — ( v l w ^ w p + Vlp) , which is consistent with Mayer (1991) 
dr /^VLWP dL e e L 
and Michael and Hatzipanayotou (1995), and — 二 — {jUp + Viw^wp), 
which is also consistent with Fung (1995). However, if the monetary distor-
tions are not equal, then the welfare and employment effects of a tariff and a 
quota depend on the capital-labor intensive ratio in production, the magni-
tudes of monetary distortions and whether the importable is a complement 
to or substitute for leisure. All the results are summarized in proposition 1 
and 2 in Section 4. 
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Next, we derive the optimal tariff rate and the indirect taxes as 
f 1 
^ L 1 + 2 
1 1 W / , P* ^l- 4>2 \ / � 
一！ w f ^ ) r 
-TV^ (他P + (1 + MVlwSWP) {Vlp+VLW^WP) 
(2.21a) 
T-Opt 
丄 二 一(^ 1 (2.21b) 
w 
i t = A z A (2.21c) 
P* 1 + 02 
where 丁叩、T�jt and r f^ are the optimal taxes on trade, on wage and on 
consumption, and e^  = G (0,1) is the supply elasticity of good 2. 
dp X2 
Equations (2.21b) and (2.21c) show that the first best policy of zero wage tax 
and zero consumption tax shown in Michael (1994) is true only if = 02 = 0, 
otherwise, the first best policy should be a wage subsidy plus a consumption 
tax (subsidy) if the monetary distortions exist. According to Palivos and 
Yip (1997), optimal tariff is zero if (/^ i = — however, equation (2.21a) 
shows this is not true when endogenous labor-leisure choice is imposed to the 
model. The optimal tariff is negative (positive) if the importable is capital 
(labor) intensive in production, and consumption is substitute for leisure. 
If ^ 02 ^ 0, the cases become more complicated and the results are 
summarized in proposition 3 in Section 5. 
3 The Model 
Consider a 2 x 2 model small open monetary economy with fixed capital 
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stock and a constant number of populations, whose working hours is flexi-
ble. There are two industries, says xi and X2, whose production functions 
exhibit constant return to scale in capital and labor with different factor 
intensive ratios, assuming no complete specialization in production. Good 
1, xi, is the exportable and good 2, X2, is the importable. The represen-
tative household consumes both good 1 and 2, Ci and C2, at the price levels 
Pi and p2 respectively, facing a generalized cash-in-advance (CIA) or liquidity 
constraint. Following Palivos and Yip (1997) and Chao and Yu (1999), the 
generalized CIA constraint is specified as follows: 
^iPlCl + 02P2C2 < Md (3.1) 
where M " is the cash balance holding by the household and E [0,1] denotes 
a constant share of purchases of good i. The generalized CIA constraint im-
plies that the household requires financing a certain part of purchases using 
the money balance holding. Here the CIA constraint generates a consump-
tion distortion, if — 02，貼 the marginal domestic rate of substitution 
(MDRS) between good 1 and 2 equals the virtual price, 二，岩(Chao and 
Yu (1999)), which is not necessary equal to the marginal domestic rate of 
transformation (MDRT), —. However, if (f)^  = 02, there is no consumption 
Pi 
distortion as MDRS is just equal to MDRT. In general, the monetary dis-
tortion do not necessarily equal (for more details, see Palivos and Yip 
(1997)). 
The representative household's utility depends on the consumption of two 
commodities, ci and C2, and leisure, h, which are assumed to be normal goods. 
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Consequently, the utility function is u = u (ci, C2,1 — L) where h = 1 — L 
and total hours available is normalized as 1，and we have Ui > 0, U2 > 0 
and Us > 0, where Ui is the partial derivative with respect to the ith variable 
in the utility function. Therefore, the household chooses the commodities 
(ci and C2)，the cash balance ( M ’ and labor supply (L) subject to the 
CIA constraint to minimize the expenditure piCi + P2Q2 + for a given 
utility level, u < u(c i ,c2,1 - L). Following Chao and Yu (1999), the indirect 
expenditure function is specified as follows 
> 
PLCI + P 2 C 2 + = WNL + / + M : 
= min (3.2) 
{CUC2,L,M'} U (CI, C2, 1 - L ) > U - (P^PiCi + 02P2C2 < M ^ � 
where Wn defines the net wage earned from the market, Wn = w — r^, w is 
the marginal return of labor and t^ is the specific wage tax, I is non-labor 
income from capital rent, M is exogenous money supply issued by the gov-
ernment. Following the property of homogeneous of degree one in prices, the 
expenditure function can be rewritten as ^ ((1 + (1 + ^2) P2, L, u)= 
(1 + (fii)pie f l , 1 + 如徑，L,ii). Then the Envelope Theorem implies 
V 1 + Pi / 
dE ^ 1 + 02P2 ^ .0 ox 
— == El = e - ； 62 = ci (0.3) 
d{l + 1 + 01 Pi 
, , X =E2 = 62 = 02 (3.4) 
QE _ 
— = EL = {1 + 0i)pieL = W (3.5) 
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where Ei and ei denote the partial derivative with respect to the ith. argument 
of E{-) and e (•)，respectively. Following Dixit and Norman (1980), Woodland 
(1982), Mayer (1991), and Michael and Hatzipanayotou (1995，1997), here w 
is the reservation wage of labor supply. The expenditure function e (•) has 
the following properties:— is the marginal utility of income; cll > 0 is the 
dC2 
labor supply effect of wage rate;^ 622 = < 0 is the compensated demand 
OPv 
effect of a virtual price change of good 2;9 em > 0 is the marginal utility of 
wage rate. 
The production side of this model is captured by the GDP function. The 
firm maximizes its revenue by choosing the size of production subject to 
the technology constraints and factor constraints, therefore, the expenditure 
function is as follows 
� 
一 +口2工2 = i^^L + rK : a^ i 二 
G{puP2,L,K) = max _ > 
“ - 2 } 工 2 = X2(L2, K2)] L I4-L2 = L; Ki + K2 = K 
(3.6) 
where Li and Ki are the factor inputs with respect to industry i, w and r are 
the factor returns of labor and capital, respectively. Using the linear homo-
geneity property in prices, we can rewrite the function as G { p i , p 2 , L , K ) = 
{ 2?2 
'PiR . The Envelope Theorem says 
V Pi / 
^ = = = (3.7) 
dpi Pi 
8 See Dixit and Norman (1980) and Mayer (1991) for the properties of expenditure 
function. 
(•^ See Chao and Yu (1999) for the definition of the virtual price. 
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^ = G2 = R2=X2 (3.8) 
dp2 
— = GL=PIRL = W ( 3 . 9 ) 
dL 
where Gi and Ri denote the partial derivative with respect to the ith ar-
gument of G(.) and R{'). The revenue function R{') has the properties: 
R22 = -TT" > 0 is the supply effect of a price of good 2; R l l = Rkk = 
op 
RLK = RKL = 0;io R2L = RL2 and R2K = RK2 are the Stopler-Samuelson 
wage and rent effect respectively. 
In equilibrium, the country's expenditure equals its revenue from pro-
duction, plus tariff revenue rm, plus money supply of the government M, 
plus lump sum transfer from aboard T. Following Chao and Yu (1999) 
and Michael and Hatzipanayotou (1995), the income-expenditure balance is 
PiCi + P2C2 + M'^ = pixi + P2X2 -\-Tm + M + T. Substitute (3.3)，(3.4), (3.5)， 
(3.7), (3,8), (3.9) and the money market equilibrium condition M^ = M into 
the income expenditure identity, together with the normalization pi = 1, we 
have the national budget constraint as follows 
e (1，p”，L, w) = i? (1, p, L, K ) + rm + + T (3.10) 
m = 62(1,P., L, u) - R2(1,P, L, K) (3.11) 
where m is the volume of import, p = p* + r is the domestic price ratio, 
丁 is the specific tariff, p* is the foreign price assumed to be fixed for small 
open economy, and py =丄 + ’p，denotes the virtual price, which represents 
1 + 01 
10 Under incomplete specialization, factor return is a function of foreign price, i.e. r = 
r(p) and w = W(p), implying RLL = RKK = RLK = RKL 二 0 
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the CIA distorted domestic price ratio. Equilibrium in labor market requires 
the reservation wage equals the net wage received by the workers, i.e. the 
marginal return of labor minus the specific wage tax. Similar to Michael and 
Hatzipanayotou (1995,1997), the condition of labor market equilibrium is 
(1 + L, u) = L, K) - T^ (3.12) 
System equations (3.10)，（3.11) and (3.12) imply that if (fh = (k = 
i.e. no monetary distortion, then the national budget constraint and the 
labor market clearing condition are exactly the same as in Mayer (1991),^^ 
and in Michael and Hatzipanayotou (1995).12 Consequently, it is true that 
the same result can be drawn, which is consistent with Mayer (1991), and 
Michael and Hatzipanayotou (1995). However, if (Ih =小2 •’ i.e. both the 
importable and the exportable share the same monetary distortion, then the 
national budget constraint is still the same as Mayer (1991), and Michael and 
Hatzipanayotou (1995), implying that there is no consumption distortion as 
the national budget constraint follows the standard form.^^ But the labor 
11 In Mayer (1991), the system equations of general equilibrium are 
e\p* {l + t),L,u] = R\p* (1+£),L,K]-{-p*tm 
eL = RL='w 
where t is the tariff rate and p* is the exogenous price of import. 
12In Michael and Hatzipanayotou (1995), the system equations are 
e (p, L, u) = R{p, L)+tm + T + T^L 
Cl 二 RL 一 Tw =叫 _ Tw 
where t is the specific tariff, T is the lump-sum transfer from aboard, and 丁也 is the specific 
wage tax. 
13 In the literature of international trade, the usual national budget constraint is 
e(l,p,u) = R{l,p,L,K) + tm 
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market clearing condition now is different from Mayer (1991), and Michael 
and Hatzipanayotou (1995). The key difference is that is included in 
equation (3.12)，which means the monetary distortion on export goods does 
have an effect on the labor market. Of course, in the general case, where 
— <fe’i.e. the monetary distortion are different for each good, then (3.10) 
and (3.12) indicate that both the consumption and labor supply decisions 
are distorted. 
4 Trade restrictions, welfare and employment 
The welfare and employment effects of trade restrictions have been exten-
sively studied in the literature. Within the general-equilibrium framework, 
it is known that trade restrictions, such as tariff and quotas, definitely hurt 
the welfare of a small open economy [see Mayer (1991), Michael (1995) and 
Michael and Hatzipanayotou (1995, 1997)]. However, this result may be 
altered in the presence of monetary distortion or CIA constraint. For in-
stance, Palivos and Yip (1997, 2003) and Chao and Yip (2001) show that a 
small open monetary economy can improve its welfare by introducing tariff 
or export subsidy. Therefore, it is still worth studying the issues of tariff 
and import quotas for the case of endogenous labor supply in presence of 
monetary distortion. 
4.1 Tariff and welfare 
To study the effect of tariff, totally differentiating the equations (3.10) 
and (3.12)，setting T^ = T = 0, evaluating at T = 0 and denoting the import 
where t is the specific tariff. 
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function as m = 62(1,^^, - i?2(l,P’ 玄)，we have 
Gil ^12 du bi 
= dr (4.1) 
(221 0,22 dL 62 
(f)<2 — (f>� 4*2 ~ 4*1 /-I ± \ where an = e ^ - , , 丄 pe2u, 1^2 = — ^ , , V^iu = (1 + 
1 + 0 1 1 + 01 
a22 = (1 + 0i)eLL，bi = ’，f^  ] "I" ’ p e 2 2 and h = Rl2 - (1 + 
1 + 01 1 + 01 
To ensure the stability of the general equilibrium, the determinant of (4.1) 
denoted as A = 011022 - 021^ 12 should be positive (proof see Appendix A). 
To determine the welfare effect of a tariff, we apply Cramer's rule and 
obtain the following expression 
芸二去 {M22 — ^2^12} 
1 伞2-<l\dc 、 
= 1 1 切「 1 1 + / 1 — / -1 ( 4 ) 
, ^ + (/>IVLwP L 1 + 02 "^J J 
» dw p 
where e"^  = — — — G ( - 1 , 0 ) is the demand elasticity of good 2，Syjp = — 
dp C2 dpw 
is Stopler-Samuelson wage's effect which is > 1 (< - 1 ) when good 2 is labor 
^ J-^ ^^ 
(capital) intensive in production, = — — G (0,1) is elasticity of labor 
uw LJ 
supply with respect to wage rate, here assumed the labor supply curve is 
O T 
not backward-bending, = — — is labor supply elasticity with respect to 
^ up L 
price, which is > 0 (< 0) when leisure and good 2 are complements (substi-
tutes). The derivation of equation (4.2) is shown in Appendix B. By using 
the homogeneity properties of demand function, we have t]^ + t]访 + Viw = ^ 
where i =good 1,2. Similarly, for labor supply, we have -^VLP'^VLW — O5 
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implying -q^ w + I l p = < 0 (> 0) if and only if consumption and leisure 
are complements (substitutes) with ri^i > 0 (< The numerator shown 
(p2 ~ 4^1 H c 
in (4.2) can be decomposed into two parts, the first part,-———e , refers to 
1 + 01 
the monetary distortion effect of consumption due to the CIA constraint,^^ 
and the second part captures the overall substitution effect of leisure and 
consumption, which includes the direct substitution effect, following Mayer's 
(1991) paper, donated as(e^ upVLw + Vip )is the substitution effect of import 
( 01-02 \ 
price; and the indirect substitution effect, denoted by 4 > 仇如 + , y?Lp I 
\ 丄 + ) 
is the substitution effect of monetary distortion of import price. The overall 
substitution effects consist of 4 different effects, the first three basically de-
fined in Mayer (1991) are the effect of an increase in the importable price on 
labor supply, t^細,the labor supply elasticity, r]Lw and the Stopler-Samuelson 
wage's effect, e^p, the last effect is specifically for this model called the mon-
etary distortion effect, (j)^  - — ~ W i t h o u t any monetary distortion, i.e. 
1 + 02 
(f)^  = (j)^  = 0, it is easy to restore back to Mayer's (1991) result (both the 
monetary distortion effect of consumption and the indirect substitution ef-
feet axe cancelled), and — equals zero, implying free trade is the optimal 
dr 
situation. On the other hand, without variable labor supply, we get Palivos 
dli 
and Yip's (1997) result (the substitution effect is excluded), implying — 
consists of only one monetary distortion effect from money. Equation (4.2) 
generalizes the results of Mayer's (1991) endogenous labor model and Palivos 
and Yip's (1997) CIA model. To make this model more intuitive, it is useful 
14In the case where leisure is a substitute for consumption, then TJLP + VLW�•，with 
巧Lp e [ -1 ,0] and G [1,0]. However, when leisure is a complement for consumption, 
then r]Lp + Vlw < 0，with r^ p^ G [0,1]. By the homogeneity properties of demand, 
must be in between [—1,0], which implies a backward bending labor supply. 
This finding is from Palivos and Yip (1997). 
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to impose the following restrictions: 
Rla: The importable is labor intensive, i . e . � > 1 
Rib: The importable is capital intensive, i.e. Swp < — 1 
R2a: Consumption is substitute for leisure, i.e. Ty^ p + t^lw�• 
R2b: Consumption is a complement to leisure, i.e. + r]^ 让 < 
R3a: No monetary distortion, i.e. 4>2 =伞 i 二� 
R3b: Both the importable and exportable share the same monetary dis-
tortion, i.e. <p2 — ^ 
R3c: The importable has higher monetary distortion, i . e .小 )� 
R3d: The importable has lower monetary distortion, i.e. (/)2 < (pi 
The overall substitution effect depends on restrictions, R1 and R2. For 
the case of Rla and R2a, if the importable is labor intensive and consump-
tion is substitute for leisure, then we set both a positive direct substitution 
effect and a positive indirect substitution effect, i.e. ewpTJiw + V L P � • and 
(b.rir. + — — — — > 0,17 so that the overall substitution effect is posi-Va ILw I-\-cf)2 Lp 
tive. For the case of Rib and R2a, if the importable is capital intensive and 
consumption is substitute for leisure, then we obtain a negative direct substi-
tution effect and a positive indirect substitution effect, i.e. ewj/iU让 + < 0 
and (pii^ Lw + ————Vlp > •，implying the overall substitution effect is neg-
1 + 02 
ative. The monetary distortion of consumption, on the other hand, depends 
on restrictions R3. Either R3a, 02 =於 i = or R3b, 4>2 = 4>i 0’ is suf-
16 For more details that consumption is substitute for or complement to leisure, see 
Philps (1982). 
17 As (/>i - 「，= I "I" t > 0, implies (f)^ > 办)，and given 7]lw + Vlp > •，we 
1 + 02 1+02 1 + 02 
finally get 小 仇 边 + 小 ; + 二 》 � > 
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ficient to imply a zero effect of monetary distortion, because MFRT always 
equals MDRS, but a negative (positive) monetary distortion effect if R3c, 
02 > (R3d, 4>2 < 4>i) holds. We no conclude: 
Proposition 1: A rise of tariff definitely hurt (improve) the welfare of a 
small open monetary economy if the importable shares either a higher (lower) 
or equal monetary distortion and is capital (labor) intensive in production, 
and consumption is substitute for leisure, otherwise, it is indeterminate. 
4.2 Tariff and employment 
Prom equation (4.1)，applying Cramer's rule again, we get the employ-
ment effect 
^ = — 021^1) 
‘ 02 — 01 d 幻爪L ‘ 
二 「 (4.3) 
A 叫 + ( ^ ) 会 K 而 + 
L \ 丄 十 
where rriL = w— e ( - 1 , 0 ) is the marginal propensity to labor supply with 
oe 
leisure assumed to be normal good, m2 = ~ ~ - G (0，1) is the marginal 
propensity of good 2，and — > 0 is the marginal utility of income. The 
derivation of equation (4.3) is shown in Appendix C. The employment effect 
of tariff consists of two components. The first is the overall monetary distor-
tion effect, denoted by — f l 产 爪 l , There are of two forces involved, one 
called negative income effect following Mayer (1991), represented by 
the other called the monetary distortion effect of consumption, denoted by 
————e"^ , explained in section 4.1. The second part is the multiplied direct 
1 + 01 
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substitution effect 1 — m � ~ p - ^ (Vlw^wp + Vip). If there is no mon-
. \ 1 + 乂」 
etaxy distortion in this model, then the employment effect can be reduced to 
the direct substitution effect only, which is given in Mayer (1991). However, 
even monetary distortion really exists, Mayer's (1991) finding still holds if 
both goods share the same degree of monetary distortion. Combining the 
restrictions Rl , R2 and R3, one can conclude: 
Proposition 2a: The labor supply responses to a tariff increase is posi-
tive (negative) if the importable shares the same monetary distortion as the 
exportable and is labor (capital) intensive in production, and leisure is sub-
stitutable in consumption. 
For cases of different monetary distortions, i.e. </>2，the employment 
effect is more complicated, due to the presence of both the overall income 
effect and the multiplied direct substitution effect. If 02 > (/>! ((/>i > (/>2)，the 
distortion parameter becomes 1 — M?(小\ F ] ^ (0,1) (G (1,1.5)), al-
L + 乂」 
ways diminishing (magnifying) the direct substitution effect {RJL^Swp + TJLP) 
and it generates a negative (positive) monetary distortion effect of consump-
tion, denoted by —~~—e"^, and thus implying a positive (negative) overall 
1 + 01 
income effect. Therefore, we can conclude that: 
Proposition 2b: The sufficient conditions for the labor supply responses 
to a tariff increase being positive (negative) are the importable has a higher 
(lower) monetary distortion and is labor (capital) intensive in production, 
and leisure is substitutable in consumption. 
4.3 Comparing welfare and employment effects 
From the perspective of the macroeconomics, it is useful to compare wel-
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fare and employment effects with each other. Combining proposition 1 and 2, 
one can obtain three meaningful cases: 1. barter economy [(f): = 4>2 = 0)? 2. 
the same monetary distortions 二 02 # 0), and 3. different monetary dis-
tortions + 02). For a barter economy, according to Mayer (1991), a tariff 
always hurt the economy but raise (reduce) employment if the importable is 
labor (capital) intensive, implying a possible trade-off between welfare and 
output. For the second case where monetary distortions are equal across 
the sectors, a tariff always improves welfare and raises employment if the 
economy imports labor intensive good, but worsens welfare and reduces em-
ployrneiit if it imports capital intensive good. In the absence of any trade 
war, there is no doubt that a capital abundance country would benefits from 
imposing tariff result in raising both welfare and output. The intuition of 
the last, general case is more complicated, saying that if the welfare effect is 
unanibiguous, labor effect is indeterminate, or vice versa. More restrictions 
are needed to determine the welfare and employment effects. For instance, 
if the difference between monetary distortions is small, then the monetary 
distortion part — — is relative small, such that a tariff may raise (reduce) 
1 + 01 
both welfare and employment if the importable is labor (capital) intensive 
and the direct substitution effect always dominates. Otherwise, it could be 
a trade-off between welfare and output. 
4.4 Quotas, welfare, employment and price level 
It is well known in the trade literature that the effect of tariff and quotas 
is equivalent. This concept is proven for a small open economy with variable 
labor supply by a number of authors, including Mayer (1991), Michael (1995), 
and Michael and Hatzipanayotou (1995, 1997). To study the effect of quotas, 
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first we modify equation (3.10), (3.11) and (3.12) as follows 
e L,u) = R L, X ) + (p — p*) Q + + T (4.4a) 
(1 + 0i)eL = RL (4.4b) 
62(1, p., — = Q (4.4c) 
where Q is import quota, and (p - p*) Q is the quota rent. Totally differenti-
ating the above equations, provided there is free trade initially, i.e. p-p* = 0, 
we can solve for 
du I w r 1 02 - 01 d 1 1 , 0 1 - 0 2 � , I ^ \\ 
(4.5) 
芸二 • 严 { 结 4 ， + 丄(1 - ( + 哪I 
dQ Q Lr]Lnj I 1 + 01 w p \ 1 + 01 J J 
(4.6) 
dp 1 CuW f A 0 2 - 0 1 \ 1 T^L f , , 01 —— M 
(4.7) 
where Q < 0 is the determinant of the differentiated system [equation (4.4) 
if the system is stable, for more details see Appendix D. Both equations 
(4.2) and (4.5), and equations (4.3) and (4.6) axe the same except the sign 
of determinants, A and Q, showing the equivalence between the effect of 
tariff and quotas for a small open monetary economy with endogenous labor 
supply. Finally, from equation (4.7), quotas can raise the price level similar 
to tariffs. 
5 Optimal tariffs 
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In the previous section, we have compared the welfare effect of tariff 
and import quotas. We have shown that they are equivalent and do not 
necessarily lower the welfare of a small open monetary economy with variable 
labor supply. In the following section, we derive the general formula of the 
optimal tariff, where the results of Mayer (1991) and Palivos and Yip (1997) 
become specific cases of our finding. 
In the presence of a specific tariff, r/® the domestic price of the importable 
is equal to p = p* + T，where p* is fixed the world price under free trade. 
Totally differentiating equation (3.10) and (3.12), setting T^； 二 T = 0，and 
applying Cramer's rule, we get 
「 , m � � 广 l + � 2 l + 02p 、 1 1 
, 二 丄 ' — [(1 + - i^d - i?..) 
- 1 ( 1 + 02)eL2 - Rl2] (0ieL + 
where 屯 is the determinant of equation system (E3), and the derivation of 
equation (5.1) is shown in Appendix E. In particular, the general formula of 
the optimal tariff rate can be obtained by setting — = 0, shown as follows: 
dr 
I 8 7 " � ( < 0) represents import tariff (export subsidy). 
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1 (t>2-(PlA^ � 
< 1 1 w f , p* — 02 \ r \ 
7 _ " 7 } ( 路  2 - r 
, 1 1 i/V i^ + 01 y ^ 
—1 + 0 JJL P � ” L p + (1 + MVLW^WP) (j]Lp+”Lw^wp) 
_ L 1 + 01 VlwP* (ko) 
二 - 知 - T " ^ 丄 、 . 
L 1 + (t>\ Vlw P 
where A = — — e ' ^ is the monetary distortion effect of consumption defined 
in Section IV, B = (—lw + — T T ^ ^ ^ - P ) {'^Lw^^p + ”Lp) is the overall 
\ P i + <^2 / 
substitution effect of leisure and consumption, which can be decomposed 
into two parts, as discussed in Section IV, C = + ’6^62 - ) < 0 
V1 +於1 乂 
and D = {tjlp + (1 + MVLW^WP) {VLP+VLW^WP) > O}'^ From equation (5.2), 
the sign of optimal tariff is determined by two factors, the monetary distor-
tion effect of consumption and the overall substitution effect of leisure and 
consumption. In the absence of money, both A and B disappear, and we set 
rj-Opt 
the Mayer (1991) result ,——=0 ’ which says free trade is still the best pol-
P* 
icy in terms of the economy's welfare. On the other side of the coin, without 
variable labor supply, both B and D disappear, and the optimal tariff rate 
19Given R2a holds, i.e the importable is a substitute of leisure, then < 0 and 
7]lw > 0. And the sign of both r]ipj.'niw^wp and T^ p^ + (1 + (f>i)VLw^ wp depend on the 
factor intensity of the goods. Both have the same positive (negative) sign if the importable 
is labor (capital) intensive in production. 
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错 • 
becomes 7 — ，which is the same solution that obtained in 
1 + 01 
Palivos and Yip (1997) ,20 showing that the optimal tariff is positive (nega-
tive) when > 02 {(f)2 > (t>\)- However, in the presence of both monetary 
distortion and labor-leisure decision, the propositions of Mayer(1991) and 
Palivos and Yip (1997) become specific cases of ours, shown as follows: 
Proposition 3: In a small open monetary economy with endogenous labor 
supply, the optimal tariff is negative (positive) if the importable shares either 
a higher (lower) or equal monetary distortion and is capital (labor) inten-
sive in production, and consumption is substitute for leisure, otherwise, it is 
indeterminate. 
This proposition is consistent with Proposition 1 in Section II, suggesting 
that trade liberalization is not always welfare enhancing. If an introduction 
of tariff, provided there is free trade initially, hurts (enhances) the welfare, 
then an export subsidy (a import tariff) is preferred to maximize the welfare. 
20ln Palivos and Yip (1997), the formula of optimal tariff rate is 
彻 c. 
, where — represents the consumption to import ratio, 
(1 + 5) es 饥 
m \m ) 
— — I = — is the output to import ratio, with m = C2 — R2, and 5 = ^——^1) (P + m) ^ 
m m 1 + 01 (P + M) 
where p denoted as time preference discount rate and fi denoted as the exogenous money 
growth rate. The key difference these two models is that the monetary distortion part in 
our model is — — — instead of ——^1) (P + M) because our model is static but the 
1 + 01 1 + 01 (P + 
other is dynamic, however, the intuition is the same. 
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For the case of equal monetary distortions, 二 (/>2’ equation (5.3) becomes 
Topt 含 A {riLp+riLw^wp) 
TJ* ~ ~ 1 , . … 1 w f � 2 
P T — e'R2) (JIlp + Vlw^WP) 
L ”Lw P 
The sign of the optimal tariff rate now depends on the direct substitution 
effect of leisure and consumption, i.e. ry細 + Given the importable 
is labor intensive in production and substitute for leisure, and then tariff is 
preferred. If the importable is capital intensive instead, then export subsidy 
is the optimal trade policy. Similar result have been shown in Palivos and Yip 
(2003), although, they consider a small open 2 x 1 Ricardian economy instead 
of ours 2 x 2 Heckscher-Ohlin economy with CIA constraint and endogenous 
labor-leisure choice. They show only the export subsidy policy is optimal for 
the case of complete specification in production. 
Our finding implies that the MDRS between the consumption goods, 
for the case of equal monetary distortion, is just equal to its MFRT, i.e. 
— = p , but the MDRS between leisure and the exportable, — , is equal to 
Ui 以1 
切,which is smaller than its MDRT,w. When the importable is labor 
1 + 01 
intensive, an introduction of tariff increases employment or reduces leisure, 
proven in Proposition 2a, and promotes the consumption of the exportable 
that raises the MDRS between leisure and the exportable. The optimal tariff 
is reached ；mtil the gap between the MDRS and MDRT disappeared. On the 
other hand, if the importable is capital intensive in production, a positive 
tariff promotes leisure which further pushes down the MDRS. Therefore, to 
achieve efficiency, we need an export subsidy to reduce leisure and close the 
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gap between the MDRS and the MDRT. 
For the case of unequal monetary distortion, — it is much more 
complicated. Let's consider the case where ^^  > 02, the MDRS between the 
U2 1 + ^2 
importable and the exportable is equal to the virtual price, i . e . — =工 + 於 p, 
which is less than their MFRT. A positive tariff can reduce consumption of 
import, causing a rise in the MDRS, until the optimal level is reached. On the 
flip side of a coin, the MDRS between leisure and the exportable is always less 
than their MDRT. When the importable is capital intensive, the response of 
employment to a positive tariff is negative, causing a further reduction of the 
MDRS. However, if the importable is labor intensive, a tariff may increase 
the employment level, thus increasing the MDRS, and consequently reducing 
both distortions of consumption and labor supply decision. However, as we 
have discussed in Section 3.3, the responses of the employment effect and the 
welfare effect of a tariff are not correlated, saying that if the welfare effect 
is unambiguous, labor effect is indeterminate, or vice versa. To summarize 
the situation, all other possible results by combining restrictions R1-R3 are 
given in the following table. 
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import good is labor intensive 
丁叩t > 0 
f ^ 0 
01 > 02 
MDRS12-MFRT12 = 0 
MDRS13-MDRT13 = 0 
丁叩t > 0 T叩t < 0 
崇 > 0 f < 0 
02 > 01 ； 
MDRSI2-MFRTI2 > 0 MDRS12-MFRT12 = 0 
MDRS13-MDRT13 = 0 MDRS13-MDRT13 < 0 
import good is capital intensive 
产 > 0 T�Pt < 0 
人 人 f < 0 尝 < 0 
01 > 02 ； 
MDRSI2-MFRTI2 = 0 MDRS12-MFRT12 < 0 
MDRS13—MDRT13 < 0 MDRSI3-MDRTI3 二 0 
< 0 
02 > 01 
MDRSI2-MFRTI2 == 0 
MDRS13-MDRT13 = 0 
Table 1 Summary table of different combination of restrictions. Always assume 
leisure is substitute for consumption. MDRS12 = —, MDRS13 = —, MFRT12 = 
Ui Ui 
p and MDRT13 = w. 
Table 1 shows two possible cases of an optimal tariff, if the importable 
is labor intensive and </>i�（/>2，or if the importable is capital intensive and 
0 2 � 0 1， t h e n the optimal tariff policy can always correct both distortions 
simultaneously. For the other two cases, an introduction of the optimal tariff 
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can reduce the distortion of one sector only. This result is similar to Chao 
and Yip (2001), which they focus on non-traded good instead of endogenous 
labor. But both have the same implication that if there is more than one 
distortion, a reduction of one distortion not necessarily reduce the other and 
improve the overall welfare. 
6 Indirect taxation and welfare 
In this section, we study the welfare effect of consumption tax, T2, wage 
tax, r^, and production subsidy, s. All T2, T切 and s axe specific taxes 
(subsidies). Following to Michael and Hatzipanayotou (1995,1997), assuming 
that wage taxes are redistributed to the household as a lump sum transfer, 
equations (3.10) and (3.12) can be written as^ ^ 
e(l,p,,L,u) = R(l,p* + s, L, K) + + � 2 6 2 - sih (6.1) 
(1 + erJXPv, L, u) = i?L(l’P* + 5, L, K) - r^ = Wn (6.2) 
where p 二 p* + T2 is the price of consumption of the importable, with p* 
denoted the world price, t必1 is the consumption tax revenue redistributed 
to the public, Wn is the net wage earned by the household, sR^ is the cost of 
production subsidy, s^ nd R l = w = w {p*) is the return of labor. Equations 
(6.1) and (6.2) can be used to solve u and L, and standard compaxative static 
exercise yields 
21 According to Michael and Hatzipanayotou (1995,1997), as the wage taxes are redis-
tributed to the household as a lump-sum transfer, tax revenue r^L doesn't appear in the 
right-hand side of income-expenditure identity. 
40 
‘ ((02 — M + (1 + M p ) 
du 1 「 广 乂 , w 1 、 
——=—< 01 H ., , , + 
dr2 ^ /I I 乂、� ^ ^ ^ 1 + 01 
( (02 - 01) + (1 + M ^ J Y ^ ， + sR2L 
1 (6.3) 
盒 = - i {(“ 3 + ((02 -⑷ + (1+M P) i f r - + 〜 } 
(6.4) 
‘ s 丑 22(1 + 0i)eLL 
du 1 � （C^) + � ^ 1 , 
+ 彻2 ( 
+ ( ( 0 2 - <T>L) + ( 1 + M ^ J + SR2L 
1 (6.5) 
where 少 is the determinant of differentiated system consisted of equations 
(6.1) and (6.2), which is positive by stability. To obtain the optimal taxation 
du du du ^ , , 
structure, we set — - = - = 1 = 0 and get 
dT2 dTyj as 
opt 
= —01 (6.6a) 
w 
i t =少1-凌2 (6.6b) 
p* 1 + 
s = 0 (6.6c) 
Equations (6.6a)，(6.6b) and (6.6c) corroborates the findings in the exist-
ing literature [see Mayer (1991), Palivos and Yip (1997), and Chao and Yip 
(2001)]. First, if there is no monetary distortion = (p2 = 0)) both the 
consumption tax and the wage tax are zero as shown in Mayer (1991). In 
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the case where monetary distortions are the same = 4>2 0)? the con-
sumption tax is zero as the MDRS between consumptions always equals its 
MFRT. When the monetary distortions are different, saying that 小：> 02 
(02 > the optimal consumption tax is positive (negative), which is con-
sistent with the literature [see Palivos and Yip (1997), and Chao and Yip 
(2001)]. Equation (6.6b) implies that if (f)^  (f)2, then either a consumption 
tax or subsidy can reduce the gap between the MDRS and the MFRT of 
consumptions until the MDRS=MFRT.22 However, in the presence of mon-
etary distortions, equation (6.6a) shows a wage subsidy always benefits the 
welfare since the wage subsidy reduces the gap between the MDRS of leisure 
and the exportable and its MDRT.^^ Finally, equation (6.6c) tells us that a 
production subsidy is unable to improve welfare. 
Before closing this section, let's compare the effect of a tariff and an 
indirect tax. It is well known in the trade literature that a tariff is just a 
consumption tax plus a production subsidy. To prove this, setting Rij = 0, 
usually we get — = — or T•叩* = To verify this statement, consider 
dr dr 2 
a barter economy = (/)2 二 •)’ from equations (4.2) and (6.3)，it is easy 
to show both ^ = — = 0 and 严七 二 o^pt = • Next suppose there labor 
dr dT2 
T叩t r f (/>! - 02 24 ‘"U u • 
supply is fixed, we obtain — = = / , , , the same result given KF J , p* p* 1 + 02 
by Palivos and Yip (1997). For a general case that ^ 02, again from 
22 Under the optimal tax system, MDRS- 二 + t ? ^ * ) = 
( V + ^ l ^ p A = , =MFRT. 
1 + (561 V l + <f>2 J 
23 Under the optimal tax system, the MDRS between leisure and the exportable is equal 
to —^―-ton = T — r ( 切 - = 1 , 人 + (fh— = ^ =MDRT. 
1 + 0 1 1 + 01 1 + 01 • . 
24 When there is no variable labor supply in our model, the formula of an optimal tariff 
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equations (4.2) and (6.3), setting r = r2 = 0, we get 
du du I (± ^ . - 丄 \ 
dT2 dr A V 1 + 01 乂 
1 1 切2 ( (Ih-ck \ ,«7、 
= - ^ T T J 已切P 'T>iVLw + 1 , , VLP (6.7) 
A 1 + V 1 + 02 / 
— 02 
where A > 0 is the determinant defined in Section III，(f)ir]Lw + -t , , Vlp� 1 + 02 
0 when consumption is substitute for leisure, and e哪 > 1 (< - 1 ) if the 
importable is labor (capital) intensive. Since Rl2 is no longer equal to zero 
by definition, one can conclude that a tariff is a consumption tax plus a 
production subsidy plus a wage tax (subsidy) in our model. Equation (6.7) 
implies that a consumption tax on the importable is (is not) Pareto superior 
to a tariff if the importable is capital (labor) intensive. 
The intuition of equation (6.7) is that in presence of monetary distortion 
and endogenous labor decision, it is better for a labor abundant economy to 
impose a consumption tax, but a tariff for a capital abundant economy. 
7 Conclusion 
The literature on the general equilibrium effects of trade restrictions gen-
erally restricts on a barter economy with fixed factor supplies or variable 
factor supplies due to international factor mobility. Some related studies 
have already extended to examine domestic factor supply due to endogenous 
supply adjustment, showing that zero taxes on trade, on international capital 
(4.2) can be reduced to — = - t T T ^ T ^ Setting R22 = = 0, one can 
+ y 
TOPT ^ 0 
obtain ——=^P-. 
P* 1 + 02 
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and on wage is the first best. For a monetary economy, however, is not the 
case, creating demand side distortions. Therefore, free trade and zero tax 
structure not really maximize the country's welfare as MDRS isn't equal to 
MFRT. In our thesis, we show that, in the presence of monetary distortions, 
wage subsidy and consumption tax (subsidy) is the first best and the second 
best policy, the optimal tariff, always exists even though other taxes are zero. 
Furthermore, in the absence of wage and consumption tax, a rise in tariff can 
raise (reduce) employment level or the total output but generates the welfare 
cost (benefit) if the importable have a higher (lower) monetary distortion, 
is labor (capital) intensive in production and substitute for leisure, which 
implies a trade-ofF between the output and welfare. Last, we show that the 
effects of a tariff or a quota are still equivalent for a monetary economy with 
endogenous factor supply. 
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Appendix A: Determine the sign of A 
The income-expenditure balance condition is 
L,u) = R (l，p, L, K)+Tm + ^ ^ ^ p e s + T (Al ) 
丄十少1 
and define the wage gap between labor supply and labor demand as 
Total differentiate equation (Al ) and (A2), at T = TU； = 0, we have 
ail du 0 
= dz 
021 2^2 dL 1 
( 0 2 ~~ \ oc 4>2 一 0 1 
where an = 1 - , , , > 0 , ai2 = -(pi^L — , , , pe2L, 2^1 = 
V 1 + / 1 + 01 
(1 + (pi)eLu and 022 = (1 + 0i)eLL, then 
dL 1 1 A <^2-01 \ “ � � 
where m2 = = ^ ^ ^ G [0’ llis the marginal propensity of good 2. To 
Cu oe 
maintain stability of labor market, assuming the labor supply function is not 
backwards bending, labor supply decreases as the wage gap decreases, i.e. 
— > 0 that implies A > 0. 
dz 
Appendix B: Derivation of equation (4.2) 
First, using the equation w = {1 + (^i)eL(l，Pv，L, u) to obtain the expres-
- S i n c e r e [0.5,2] and ^ = [-0.5,1], ( l - > 0 
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sion of 灯 " , 幻 and — . Totally differentiating, we have 
eLL GuCLL ^uCLL CLL 
dw = (1 + I + ^eL2dp + BLidL + emdu 
(i) Holding w and u fixed, we obtain 
坐=一 (1 + 驅 = ( B 2 a ) 
SLL (1 +於 2 )办 1 + 小 ^ ) 
where T/rp = ^ ― is labor supply elasticity with respect to price of good 2, 
P op L 
and - 1 <r]ip <0 
(ii) Holding p and w fixed, we get 
^ = (B2b) 
eLL du 
(iii) Next, we have 
em = dL du 二 = m i (已之。） 
euSLL du de de w 
where TUL = W— is marginal propensity of labor supply, and —1 < TUL < 0 
de 
(iv) Thus, we obtain 
eLue2 dL de dLdel + 1 + (/>! dL 1 + 01 L 
euCLL 一 de dp, - de dp 1 + 02 1 + 02 办 1 + (fe P 厂 
(V) Holding u and p fixed, we have 
1 (1 + (t)i)dL h … 礼 , 1 1 乂、L moc^� 
— = ^ ~ = 1 + = 1 + 小 i)7jlLw (B2e) 
CLL dw dw w 
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where TIT,,, = - ~ ~ - is elasticity of labor supply, and 0 < < 1 
ow L 
(iv) Next, using Stopler-Samuelson approach to obtain Rl2 
RL2 = R2L = ^ = - S ^ P (B2f) 
op P 
where £.wp = ^ ― is Stopler-Samuelson wage effect e^p > 1 or < —1 
op w 
(vii) Finally, using the demand elasticity of good 2 denoted ase'^ e ( - 1 , 0 ) 
and the supply of elasticity of good 2 e® G (0,1) to derive 622 and R22 
一 二 ’ 2 = ’ P = 二 ㈣ (B2g) 
dp C2 dp C2 1 + (th C2 62 
= = = (B2h) 
op X2 op X2 ri2 
The welfare effect of a tariff 
^ = lejr 1 + 01 1 + ei^ L . I (B3) 
aC卞卜—(1十⑷坐仏1〜給，） 
� [ e r ^ L � ^^^CllJ \ eLL 1 + ^1 eLLj 
substituting equations (B2) into (B3), we get the following 
du 1 w f 1 02 - 01 d , 1 1 ^ [. , 01 - 02…1 / 。 , ^  \\ 
— = X — i T 1 , r + -R^ (PIVLW + 1 , . VLP [ILLW^WP + VLP) f 
dr A I L 1 + 01 l + L 1 + ^2 P � \ J 
Appendix C: Derivation of equation (4.3) 
Similar to the derivation of equation (4.2) in Appendix B, the employ-
ment effect of a tariff is 47 
dL 1 eu'^yi^c^i J eLL e ^ L . . ( � 
石 = I �已 l l 。 ‘ 、 e J k _ ( M + 伞2 恍 (CI) 
-(1 + 诊 1 + 01 1 + 0 , 2 2 
substituting equations (B2) into (Cl), we have 
^ = l i 罕 + [1 — W ( ^ ) l 会 + rjLp) I 
Appendix D: Quotas, welfare, employment and price level 
The general equilibrium conditions are characterized by the following 
equations 
(1 + 0i)eL -RL = Z 
- R2[1,p,L,R�= m 
Totally differentiating, setting p = p* ,T = 2; = 0, and yields 
Cii Ci2 Ci3 du 0 
C21 C22 C23 dL = Q dm 
C31 C32 C33 dp 1 
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( (p2 — \ 丄 <p2 ~ 4^1 
where Cn = e^ 1 - - — — " ^ 2 > 0, Ci2 = -(piCi — , , , pe2L, 
\ 1 + / 1 + 01 
Cl3 = - ’ + / l } 二 2 购 2 ’ C21 = (1 + (i>i)eLu, C22 = (1 + ^BLL, 
C23 = (1 + 4)2)^12 — Rl2, C31 = e2u，C32 = e2L — R2L and C33 = — 
丄十 
(i) First, we use stability condition to derive the sign of determinant fi, 
similar to Appendix A, we have 
Cn C12 Ci3 du 0 
C21 C22 C23 dL = 1 dz 
C31 C32 C33 dp 0 
dL 1 「广1 0 2 - 0 1 � , 1 + 02 p � 工 。 於 2 - 0 1 1 + 02 1 \ � = 7： e^ 1 - ； I . '7712 T—^622 一丑22 + . , , . pe22 > 0 
dz n V 1 + J + ) 1 + 01 1 + 01 . 
substituting equations (B2) into the numerator, we get 
Cn Ci2 Ci3 
eu 1 — 1 " rn2 < 0 implying Q 二 C2i C22 C23 < 
L P \ l + 乂 � 
C31 C32 C33 
0 
(ii) Next, we derive the welfare, employment effect and price level of 
quotas. 
The welfare effect is 
f - ^ p ' - ^ ] ((1 + 0 2 ) 化 - 1 
du _ 1 2 V ^LL l + eLLj V sll eLLj 
• - ^ \ n 丄 A � 1 f - 0 1 1 + � 
- ( 1 + 01 — - , , pe22 
GlL \ 1 + 0 1 1 + 0 1 J 
I w r 109 — J 1 w 1 f , — (ho \ ( \ 1 
= O — 1 T T T T F ^ + jr^ + V - L I ^ ^ p {Vlp + VLU^ W^P) ^ 
^VLw [ L 1 + 01 ^ + (PlPVLw\ 1 + 02 J J 
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The employment effect is 
A � 2-�1— \ L , . RL2]] 
- — 产 +(1 + 广 ^ 路 
� eu^LL 1 + 1 + ‘ 
The price level is 
兴 = ^ e ^ e U l + M { f l - + ^ ^ U ^ + ^ P - ) I 
dm n [\ 1 + 01 乂 eu^LL^LL \ eiL 1 + eiL J J 
1 euW r / \ 1 rriL f , , (th — � 2 \\ 
Appendix E: The derivation of optimal tariffs 
The general equilibrium is 
e L,u) = R L, K)+Tm+ (El) 
m = e2(l,p们 L’ii) - R2{1,P,L,K) 
(1 + 0 i ) eL( l ,PV, L, u) = RL(XP, L, K) (E2) 
where p = p* + r. 
Totally differentiating (El) and (E2), we get 
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叫 1 吻 & 二 久 d r (E3) 
0；21 0；22 dL P2 
� (T 丄 / 1 + 0 2 „ \ 
where an = ^u 1 - ^ 2 一 + ,丄 ,Oii2 = -(Pi^L-r I , , e2L — — 
L VP 1 + 01/J + / 
<1)2 —小“ o / 1 + 02 1 + D � ,小 2 —小 + 丄 ^ 
1 + 01 1 + + J 1 + 01 1 + 01 
(1 + 0i)eLu，0:22 = (1 + 0i)eLL and /?2 = Rl2 一（1 + <fe)eL2. 
du 
The Optimal tariff, by setting 石 二 0’ is 
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� + + A 1 1 
丁 (1 + 似 
, 二 丄 < _ - [(1 + MeL2 - RL2\ - R2Lj ^ 
- [ ( 1 + (/>2)eL2 — RL2\ (PIEL + L \ 丄+少1 7 � J 
^ ^ 卢 ） [ ( 1 + - — 1 -
V ' eLL 1 + 01 eLL J . 2乂 eLL eLL J 
opt = _ 1 eLL 1 + 01 1 + (t>l 1 
[ 1 
- V 1 + ^LL eiL / L eiL C L L � _ 
丄 於 2 - 1 
< L l + 01 
1 1 W F , P* - 02 \ / , 、 
^ I + � � ” L P ) 
7 _ 一 1 路 r 
- 7 — {tJLP + (1 + {vlw^WP + VLP) 
_ L 1 + 01 
= 丄 丄 、 
L 1 + 01 VLW P 
Under Cla and C2a, A • 0 iff (fe 多 5 > 0严 C < 0 and D > 0 and 
we get 
26As - ^ L Z ^ = ” > 0’ implies > ^ ^ > � ^ ^ a n d given 
^ 1 + 02 l+</>2 P 1 + 02 
iLw + Vlp > 0，we finally get (p^r]^^ + ^J^jT^VLp > 
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Conditions 苦 
Cla, C2a and C3a A = B = 0 = 0 
Cla, C2a and C3b A = 0, B > 0 > 0 
Cla, C2a and C3c A < 0, S > 0 < 0 (> 0) iff A dominates (is dominated) 
Cla, C2a and C3d A>0,B>0 > 0 
Similarly, under Clb and C2a, A ^ 0 iff (^>2 g ^i, 5 < 0, C < 0 and 
D > 0 and also we get 
Conditions 学 
Clb, C2a and C3a A = B = 0 = 0 
Clb, C2a and C3b A = 0,B<0 < 0 
Clb, C2a and C3c A < 0, 5 < 0 < 0 
Clb, C2a and C3d A>0, B <0 > 0(< 0) iff A dominates (is dominated) 
Appendix F: Optimal consumption tax and wage subsidy 
e L,u) = R + s, L, K) + + � 2 6 2 - si?2 (Fl) 
(1 + 0i)eL(l，P., L, u) = Rl{1,P* + s, L, K) - r^ = w^ (F2) 
Totally differentiating (Fl) and (F2), we get 
夕 11 912 du 9n 012 7 � 13 , 
= (272 + dTw + dS 
921 922 dL 621 O22 没 23 
where gn = e^ 1 - m2 ， + | , 
仍 2 = - ( � 1 + i f ^ - ( ( 如 - 似 + (1 + � P ) 
921 = (1 + 0i)eLu, 922 = (1 + 0i)eLL, 
53 
( To \ 59* I + (f)o 
知 二 ( ( ‘ 01) + (1 + ^ Y ^ Y T J 6 2 2 ， 〜 = 0 ， 
6*13 = - s i ? 2 2 , 021 = - ( 1 + M eL2, O22 = - 1 and 6*23 = RL2. 
The welfare effect of a consumption tax 
‘ ((<^2 - + (1 + M p ) 
du 1 � fj^ � w I 1 
——=—< 01 H T-—"" "h 
dT2 少 1 n 丄 A � � 乂 切乂 1 + 01 
((^2 - 01) + (1 + M + 
1 (F3) 
The welfare effect of a wage tax 
= J f ^ ^ ^ + - M + (1 + M + sR2L] 
(F4) 
The welfare effect of a production subsidy 
� 
S 尺 22(1 + ^i)eLL 
t 」 [ + 1 
+ ( ( ^ 2 - M + (1 + M 尝 ) + SR2L I 
1 (F5) 
dUj 
Setting ——=——=0, the optimal tax system is represented by 
dT2 dTw 
((02 - 01) + (1 + M g ) ]^P*e22eLL = 0 (F6) 
-(《1 + 3 T ^ ^ - ( ( 如 - « + (1 + 如 ) 劣 i f ^ e - - s R � = 。 
(F7) 
-si?22(l + 0i)eLL = O (F8) 
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Solving (F6), (F7) and (F8), we have 
'TT = 01 - 0 2 
1 + 02 
- = - 0 1 
w 
s = 0 
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